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WERNER RAUB 
A Note on Trust and Testosterone~ 
1 The Trust Game 
Consider the Trust Game. The game (see Figure 1) involves two actors, the 
trustor (actor 1) and the trustee (actor 2). The game starts with a move of the 
trustor. She can choose between placing or not placing trust. If trust is not 
placed, the interaction ends and the trustor receives payoff P1, while the 
trustee receives payoff P2. If trust is placed, the trustee chooses between 
honoring and abusing trust. If he honors trust, the payoffs for trustor and 
trustee are R > Pi, i = 1, 2. If trust is abused, the payoff for the trustor is 
I was a teaching and research assistant (,Studentische Hilfskraft") in Carl Friedrich Geth-
marm's group at the University of Essen in the 1970s. ,Dalle" helped me a lot in tlnding 
my way in science as a cognitive and social system. His ,Oberseminar", including dinner af-
terwards, was fascinating (and very entertaining). We often disagreed in this seminar, Dalle 
and others knowing how to advocate their own positions. With hindsight and meanwhile 
own experience in leading research groups and supervising students, I much respect, too, 
the ways in which he coped with ,jugendlicher Obermut" of various members of his group, 
myself included after I had learned from Dalle and others that it makes sense to come up 
with arguments in a seminar, rather than keeping arguments for yourself, even for a some-
what shy student. I later on decided to continue in sociology rather than philosophy. After I 
had left his group in the 1980s, we had only very occasional correspondence and met only 
once when he invited me for a talk in Essen in the 1990s. Also due to these circumstances, 
my contribution is - as far as I can see - not related to his own work in a systematic way 
(I avoid the conventional move for Festschrift-authors to focus on common interests in in-
terdisciplinary work or to use the brief discussion of a methodology of science-issue in sec-
tion 3 below to claim a loose relation; in fact, the focus on testosterone effects could be 
considered the better link to some features of Dalle's Oberseminar in the 1970s). Still, I 
find it an honor to be able to contribute a brief note to this Festschrift. .\Iy note is very 
much a result of ongoing joint work with Vincent Buskens and Jack van Honk at "Utrecht 
University and I am grateful to both of them for allowing me to use ideas that result from 
our collaboration (including the use of some material from V. Buskens, \Y./. Raub: ,Rational 
Choice Research on Social Dilemmas") and for helpful comments. Financial support by the 
\Jetherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) under grants S 96-168 :md 
PGS S0-)70 for the PIONIER-program ,The :\Ianagement uf \fatches" :~nd under grant 
.~IH)-OS-089 for the project ,,Commitments and Reciprocitv" is grarefullv acknowledged. 
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S1 < P1, while the trustee rece1ves Tz > Rz. Think of payoffs in terms of 
money (or another valuable) for the respective actor. The game is played as a 
non-cooperative game, i. e., actors cannot make binding agreements or 
binding unilateral commitments. Actors are fully informed about all features 
of the game (roughly, each actor knows that the game in Figure 1 is played, 
knows that the other actor knows this, and so forth). 
Figure 1: The Trust Game (St < P1 < Rt, Pz < & < Tz) 
Assume (1) that actors are ,selfish" in the sense of ,utility = own money" 
and (2) that actors are ,rational" in the standard game-theoretic sense of 
(subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium behavior, i. e., roughly, each actor 
behaves as if he or she maximizes his or her expected utility, given the other 
actor's strategy.2 Under these assumptions, the trustee would abuse trust, 
while the trustor does not place trust (in a sense, anticipating on the trustee's 
abuse of trust if trust would be placed). If trust is not placed, however, both 
trustor and trustee are worse off than when trust is placed and honored. 
See P. D asgupta: , Trust as a Commodity"; D . M. Kreps: ,Corporate Culture ::wd Eco-
nomic Theorv" ; C. Snijders: Tmst rmd Com!71ltments, chaps. l - 4; V. Buskens: Joda/1"\'ehvork.s 
.111d 1 'ntJt, chaps. 1- 3 on the Trust Game. Here and subsequently throughout the paper we 
:1eglect quite some further ::~ssumptions and ,technicalities". Readers may consult the literature 
memioned as well as, e. g., E. Rasmusen: Cames and !njormation for a rcxtbook on non-
.:oiJperanve games. 
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1\s Rapoport aptly put it\ individual rationality in the sense of incentive-
guided and goal-directed behavior as conceptuali7ed in the Nash equilibrium 
leads to collective irrationality in the sense of Pareto-suboptimality in the 
Trust Game. Such a ,cont1ict" between individual and collective rationality is 
the core feature of a social dilemma and trust relations are a paradigmatic 
example of a social dilemma involving two actors. The Trust Game is a one-
sided version of the famous Prisoner's Dilemma in the sense that onlv one 
.' 
actor, the trustee, has an incentive for ,opportunistic'' behavior. \'Vhile ,social 
dilemma" is a label commonly used in social psychology and also sociology, 
such a situation is often referred to as a ,problem of collective action" or the 
,tragedy of the commons" in political science and as a ,public goods prob-
lem" in economics. For various and well-known reasons, the analysis of such 
situations is a core topic of social theory and social philosophy. -1 
2 Explaining trusts 
Other than the theoretical analysis implies, everyday experience indicates and 
systematic empirical research confirms that trustors are sometimes trustful 
and place trust, while trustees are sometimes trustworthy and honor trust. 
Similar phenon1ena are known from research on other social dilemmas: 
actors sometimes manage to ,solve" such dilemmas. Here, we mention only 
t\VO explanations why actors are sometimes trustful and trust\vorthy. 
\. R:tpnpurt: ,Pris• !Ocr\ Dilernma". 
h 'r LT• H1nmic~, ,ce J. ( ). Lc'dv:ml: ,,PuLlic Co• ),J:.;··. :::we \'- Busku1s and \\. R:wb: .,R:Hl< 111:d 
1 hoKe Rt·<.,c:lrch on Social Dilemmas·' tor a recent ~urvt'y fro!ll a "' lCiulu,l';JCal pc:r-,pectivl' 
,di<L r:. ~~-. B. 1 .:lhnu: [ 'cn;!Jn·tllm tor S<Kial philosoplw. 
V BwJ:cn·' :111d \v'. Rauh: ,RariotLl1 (hoJo: Research 011 Socul Dilemmas" for ttll~ther 
r:r-(,rm:;nr:n •jJl ri1e rTurc·:·i:Ii C<JF<-;rcd 1nrbis :;c·•'fl()ll. 
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2.1 Repeated interactions 
One explanation focuses on repeated interaction.6 Assume that trustor nd 
trustee play the game in Figure 1 again and again. More precisely, assume th t 
after each Trust Game another Trust Game is played with proba ili 
w (0 < 1v < 1), while the repeated interaction ends after each round wi pr 
bability 1 - w. In such an indefinitely repeated Trust Game, the trus r an 
use a conditional strategy that rewards a trustee who honors trust by pi~ in 
trust again in future games. Conversely, the trustor can punish abuse tru. t 
through not placing trust in at least some future games. If the trust r u 
conditional strategy, the trustee can gain Tz rather than & in the short run b, 
'' ' J 
abusing trust. However, abusing trust will then be associated with obtainin 
only Pz in (some) future encounters with no trust placed by the trustor; " h.ilc 
honoring trust will result in larger payoffs than Pz in those future encol}nt r 
if the trustor goes on placing trust. Thus, anticipating that the trustor ma u 
a conditional strategy, the trustee has to balance short-term (T2 - ) and 
long-term (Rz- Pz) incentives. It can be shown that the indefinitely repeat d 
Trust Game, under some additional standard assumptions, has an equilihriiun 
such that trust is placed and honored in each round if and only if the ' C: n-
tinuation probability w is large enough compared to some threshold involvin 
the trustee's payoffs Tz, Rz, and Pz. 
As a variant on this approach, assume that the Trust Game is repeatedTmi-
tely often. Clearly, in the fmal round, equilibrium behavior requires that tru t 
would be abused and no trust will be placed. However, this means that b -
havior in the last but one round cannot have effects on behavior in the fmal 
round. Hence, no trust will be placed in the last but one round and so forth . 
back to the first round. Things now change dramatically by introducing in-
complete information. Assume that there is a positive ex-ante probability J( 
that the trustee actually has no incentive to abuse trust, i. e., his payoff from~' 
abusing trust is T2 * < Rz (an alternative assumption leading to essentially the · 
same results would be to assume that the trustee has no opportunity to abuse .. ··
trust with probability J[). The trustor knows the probability J[ but cannot di-
' See, e. ~., \1. T:1ylor: The PoJS!hi!ity of Coopemtion and R. Axelrod: The f:. mlutio11 ~l Cooperatiofl_ _ .. _. .... _,._ .O'i 
r'or intluential applications. See C. F. Camerer and K. \X!eigelt: ,Experimental Tests of a Se-
cluenrial Equilibrium Reputation Model' ' ; P. Dasgupta: .,Trust as a Commodity" for work 
, 1n rcpe:1ted T n1 s t ( ~Jmes with incomplete inform~tion. 
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reedy obscrYc whether the trustec:'s pa~·otf from abusing trust is T: or T,·t . 
.'\,'()\\, if the trustor places trust in some round of the repeated game that is 
not the final round, trust may be honored for one of t\Yo very different 
tT~lsons. First, the trustee's payoff could be T:* < R: so that there is no 
incentive at :1ll for the trustee to abuse trust. Second, the trustee's payoff 
could be 12 > R: but the trustee follo\vs an incentive for reputation building. 
The trustee knows that if he abuses trust, the trustor can infer for sure that 
the trustee's payoff from abusing trust is T:o. > R:o. and will thus never place 
trust again in future rounds. On the other hand, if the trustee honors trust, 
the trustor remains uncertain about the trustee's incentives and may place 
trust again in the future. Conversely, the trustor can anticipate on such 
behavior of the trustee and may therefore be inclined to indeed place trust. In 
this game, the trustor can control the trustee in that placing trust in future 
rounds depends on honoring trust in the current round and the trustor can 
learn about the incentives of the trustee fron1 the trustee's behavior in 
previous rounds. The result is a subtle interplay of a trustor who tries to learn 
about and to control the trustee, taking the trustee's incenti1.res for reputation 
building into account, and a trustee who balances the long-term effects of his 
reputation and the short-term incentives for abusing trust, taking into 
account that the trustor anticipates on this balancing. It can then be shown 
that the game has an equilibrium that does involve placing and honoring trust 
in some and possibly many rounds of the repeated game. J\Iore precisely, in 
that equilibrium, the game starts with trust being placed and honored in a 
nun1ber of rounds. j\fterwards, a second phase follows in 1.vhich the trustor 
and the trustee with T: > R2 ranclomize their behavior until the trustor does 
not place trust or the trustee abuses trust. After trust has not been placed or 
has been abused for the first time, the third and last phase starts in which no 
trust is placed until the end nf the game. A remarkable feature of the model is 
that quite some honored trust can be induced by equilibrium behavior even if 
the probability ;1 tlut the trustee hJs nu incenti1.·e to abuse trust is srn;lll. 
>.Jote that both under indefinitely often as \\ell :ts finitely repeated interac-
tinns, trust - in the sense of both trustfulnl'SS and trustworthiness - can be a 
result ()t indi\'lcluallv ratiomd behavior < >f selfish actors I ,trust as a result uf 
(.:n li~ h tened se· If- i 1l feTe"::. I''\ 
474 \'V'ERNER RAUB 
2.2 One-shot interactions 
Even if the Trust Game is played only once, experiments show, quite some 
trust is placed and honored. Similar evidence is available for other social di-
lemmas. To account for such findings, one option is to relax the rationality 
assumption and employ a bounded rationality perspective. For example, one 
could assume that subjects are used to repeated interactions that are common 
in life outside the laboratory. The assumption then is that subjects errone-
ously apply rules in isolated encounters that are appropriate when interactions 
are repeated . .J\!Iore generally, Binmore argues that behavior in experimental 
games can be expected to be consistent with the assumption of selfish game-
theoretic rationality only if the game is easy to understand, adequate incen-
tives are provided, and sufficient time is available for trial-and-error learning.7 
Second, there are approaches that maintain the rationality assumption but 
modify the selfishness assumption. These approaches thus abandon the as-
sumption that subjects care exclusively about their own material resources in 
the sense of ,utility = own money". Rather, it is assumed that subjects, or at 
least some subjects, have other-regarding preferences. To get a flavor of how 
assumptions on other-regarding preferences can be used to account for plac-
ing and honoring trust in a Trust Game as an isolated encounter, consider a 
simple version of a social preferences model, namely, Snijders' guilt modeLs 
Assume that actor i's utility is given by Ui(Xi, x;) = Xi- j3imax(xi- Xj, 0) with 
monetary payoffs Xi and x; for the actors i and j and /3i > 0 a parameter repre-
senting i's guilt due to an inequitable allocation of monetary payoffs. Hence, 
in a Trust Game with payoffs in terms of money and Pt = P2 and R1 = R2, the 
trustee's utility from abused trust would be T2- /32 (Tz - St), while utilities 
correspond to own monetary payoffs in all other cases. Furthermore, assume 
actor heterogeneity with respect to the guilt parameter j3i in the sense that 
there are actors with a large guilt parameter, while j3i is small or even equals 
~ See overviews on one-shot games in C. F. Camerer: Behavioral Came Theory; C. F. Camerer, 
E. Fehr: ,Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental Games"; J. 0. Led-
vard: ,Public Goods". On a bounded rationality perspective, see K. Binmore: Came Tbeory 
,md the Social Contract, chap. 0.4.2 and similar arguments in D. M. Kreps: Came T11eory Ltnd 
bw101mc. ~lode/ling. 
See, e. g., E. Pehr and K. M. Schmidt: ,The Economics of f"'airness, Reciprocity and Altru-
:sm'' for an instructive overview of models including other-regarding preferences :md C. 
.~nijders: fmJt and Commitment>. 
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zero for other actors, namely, those with seltl.sh preferences. Finally, assume 
incomplete information of the trustor on the trustee's guilt parameter, with 7r 
being the probability that {32 is ,large enough" so that the trustee's utility from 
abusing trust is smaller than his utility from honoring trust, i. e., T2-
{J2(T2- St) < R2. ,Large enough" thus means {32 > (T2- &)I (T2- St). Equi-
librium behavior now requires that a trustee with {32 > (T2 - R2) I (T2 - St) 
honors trust, while a trustor places trust if 7r > (Pt - St) I (R1 - S1). 
Again, we have arguments why trust will be sometimes placed and hon-
ored. These arguments either involve dropping the assumption of game-theo-
retic rationality or they involve dropping the selfishness assumption. 
3 Neuroscience and research on social dilemmas 
Applications of theoretical ideas and methods as well as technical tools of 
neuroscience to human action and interaction are flourishing since the late 
1990s. The number of empirical studies is rapidly growing. Various reviews 
and edited volumes as well as special issues of journals are meanwhile avail-
able and the first handbook has appeared recently. 9 
Neuroscience applications to human interactions include empirical studies 
on social dilemmas. 10 Research in this area can be potentially useful for vari-
ous reasons of which we mention only one that derives from a methodology 
of science argument. The empirical evidence that trust is sometimes placed 
and honored and similar empirical evidence on other social dilemmas is not 
always easily reconcilable with the standard assumptions of individually ra-
tional and selfish behavior. Thus, alternatives to these assumptions are desir-
able. From a methodology of science perspective, though, a typical problem 
associated with such alternative assumptions is that they are, compared to the 
standard assumptions, less parsimonious and more complex and are thus 
endangered by less testability. Hence, it is essential to ensure that alternative 
') Review: C. F. Camerer, G. Loewcnstein, D. Prelec: ,Neuroeconomics". Edited volumes: C. 
Frith and D. Wolpert (eds.): The Nmroscience r!f Soczal [ntemrtion; J. T. Cacioppo and G. G. 
Berntson (eds.): So(ial Nmroscience. Special issues: CtJmts and Emnomic Hebm,ior, edited by A 
Rustichini (2005) and Emnomiu and PhiloJophy, edited by G. Bonanno et al. (2008). Hand-
book: P. Glimcher et al. ( eds.): 1'\Jettrouxmomiu. 
1
'
1 F~. g., K. McCabe et al.: ,"\ Functional lmaging Study of Cooperation''; J. K. Rilling et ~11.: 
,; \ ~eural Basis for Social Cooperation''; A. G. Sanfev et al.: ,The Neural Basis of Eco-
nr >tmc Decision-i\faking". 
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assumptions not only account for well-known empirical evidence that is hard 
to reconcile with the standard assumptions but that alternative assumptions ·-
also offer new predictions. The application of theoretical ideas, methods, and 
tools from neuroscience might be helpful in this respect and the added value . 
of such applications will depend among other things on contributing to th . 
generation and empirical test of new predictions.'' 
Quite some studies in this field employ brain imaging methods such , 
PET and fNIRI, but also electric brain stimulation, studies of psychopatholo-. 
gy and brain damage in humans, psychophysical measurement, and diffusj n 
tensor imaging.'2 However, another approach has emerged recently that us 
neuropharmacological manipulation and studies the effects of substan 
such as the neuropeptide oxytocin. The pioneering experiment by Kosfeld 
Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, and Fehr in this field showed that exogenou t 
administering oxytocine induces more trustfulness in a game that closely re,_ 
sembles the Trust Game. Baumgartner, Heinrichs, Vonlanthen, Fischbacher 
and Fehr explore the neural mechanisms underlying such effects by combili:. 
ing oxytocin administration with the use of fi\1RJ.13 
4 Trust and testosterone: outline for an experiment 
Building upon the Kosfeld et al. experimental paradigm, we (Buskens, Van 
Honk, Raub) are currently studying the effects of administering another hor- . · 
mone, namely, testosterone on trustfulness as well as trustworthiness. More 
specifically, we wish to discriminate between alternative hypotheses on such 
behavioral effects. The first hypothesis (H1) is that increased testosterone 
levels are associated with behavior that represents increased selt1shness, pos.;. 
sibly also in the sense that actors behave as if they derive additional utility 
rather than guilt and, thus, disutility from an inequitable allocation of mone-
' ' K. R. Popper: ,Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge"; I. Lakatos: 
,Falsification and the J\lethodology of Scientific Research Programmes". See also E. Fehr 
and C. F. Camerer: ,Social Neuroeconomics" for a discussion of rhis issue. 
12 See the overview in C F. Camerer, G. Loewenstein :md D. Prelec: , Neuroeconomics", 
:;ection 2. 
i I .\tL ((osfeld et al.: ,Oxytocin increases Tmst in Humans'' . See P. J. Z.ak, A. r\. Stanton and 
S. Ahmadi: ,Oxytocin Increases Generosity in Humans" for a similar study on the effects 
of oxytocin on human generosity. T. Baumgartner et :1l. : , ( hvrocin Shapes the ;'\ieural Cir-
cuirrv of Trust and Trust ,\daptarion 1n Humans". 
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tary payoffs that is in their advantage. The alternative hypothesis (H2) is that 
increased testosterone levels are associated with behavior of actors as if they 
are more inclined to individual rationality. Note that these are indeed alterna-
tive hypotheses: while Hl is on how testosterone relates to selfish behavior, 
H2 is on how testosterone relates to individually rational behavior - and self-
ishness is not the same as individual rationality. Note, moreover, that these 
are hypotheses on how testosterone levels are associated with observable 
behavior rather than on the underlying psychobiological mechanisms that 
generate such associations.14 
Employing the insights sketched above on how to explain trustfulness and 
trustworthiness, it becomes transparent how these alternative hypotheses can 
be tested experimentally against each other. Consider an experiment in which 
subject play one-shot as well as repeated Trust Games with suitably chosen 
parameters for the monetary payoffs as well as for the number of iterations of 
the game or for the continuation probability w. H 1 would then imply that 
increased testosterone levels should be related to less trustfulness as well as 
less trustworthiness in both the one-shot and in the repeated Trust Game. In 
the one-shot game, the effect of testosterone would be that actors behave as 
if the guilt parameter j3 becomes smaller. This would imply a negative effect 
on trustworthiness. Assuming that trustors anticipate this, a negative effect 
on trustfulness likewise follows. Such a negative effect on trustfulness fur-
thermore follows when extending the guilt model in a meanwhile standard 
way by adding a component in the trustor's utility function that represents 
envy due to unequitable payoffs in favor of the trustee. 15 In the repeated 
game, the effect of testosterone would be behavior as if the short-term in-
centive to abuse trust is larger. As a consequence, less trustfulness as well as 
less trustworthiness is expected for the same values of the other parameters 
such as the continuation probability w in the case of the indefinitely often 
repeated Trust Game or the number of games in the finitely repeated version. 
Conversely, H2 would imply different effects of increased testosterone levels 
in the one-shot and in the repeated Trust Game. For the one-shot Tmst Game, 
H2 would imply that increased testosterone levels should not be related posi-
'~ See, e. g., J. Van Hunk and D. J. L. G. Schutter: ,Testosterone Reduces Consctous Detec 
rion of Signals Serving Soctal Correction" on psvchobiological mechanisms possibly under-
Inn,;; testosterone effects on human behavior. 
1
- F .. ~~., E. Fehr, K. M. Schmidt: ,A Therm· of Fairness, Competition, .wd Cooperation''. 
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tive!J and might even be related negative!J to trustfulness and trustworthiness, 
depending on whether trustfulness and trustworthiness in the one-shot Trust 
Game are driven by other-regarding preferences or by bounded rationality. 
Assuming that trustfulness and trustworthiness in the one-shot game are 
driven by other-regarding preferences, one would expect no effect of testos-
terone levels in the one-shot game under H2 since under H2 there would be 
no relation between testosterone levels and preferences. Assuming that trust-
fulness and trustworthiness in the one-shot game are driven by bounded 
rationality, one would even expect a negative relation between testosterone 
levels and trustfulness as well as trustworthiness under H2. 
For the repeated Trust Game, though, H2 would imply that increased testos-
terone is related positivelY to trustfulness as well as trustworthiness. The reason 
is that, for appropriate values of the parameters, trustfulness and trustworthi-
ness are a result of individually rational behavior. Thus, under H2, one would 
expect less deviation from this individually rational pattern. Note, too, that 
the one-shot Trust Game is strategically ,simpler" than the repeated versions 
of the game and that it is less intuitively ,transparent" for subjects what indi-
vidually rational equilibrium behavior implies for the repeated Trust Games 
compared to the one-shot version. Given H2, this should strengthen the 
testosterone effect in the repeated game. 
We are in the process of conducting experiments on testosterone effects 
on trustfulness as well as trustworthiness along these lines, employing a vari-
ant of the Trust Game, namely, the version that was used by Kosfeld et al. 
Obviously, our sketch abstracts from many details of the experimental design 
such as manipulation checks and measurements of a number of control vari-
ables. Specifically, the design includes measurements of various beliefs of 
subjects on whether or not they belong to the experimental group with in-
creased testosterone levels or to the placebo control group as well as beliefs 
of subjects on testosterone et1ects on their own and their partner's behavior.J6 
\'Ve will report on these design features in future publications, obviously to-
gether with results of the experiment. 
' Tn simplifv, \VC have <lbstracted more ur less complerelv from such beliefs. Thev require a 
, 1 ;nstder:lblv more deniled discussion. 
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